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Note




The Federal Communications Commission (Commission) and fed-
eral courts recently dealt with a form of broadcasting technology that
could pave the way toward decreased television content regulation. The
system, called teletext,1 possesses characteristics typical of both television
and print communication. Teletext is similar to television in that the
viewer may receive a variety of textual and graphic information on a
television screen simply by purchasing either a decoder or a television set
already equipped with a decoder. Teletext is also similar to print media
in that it produces no sound and the viewer reads information that ap-
pears on the television screen. The teletext viewing process has been de-
scribed as follows:
The teletext viewer begins typically by watching the display of a table
of contents, which indicate[s] what information is available and at
which pages it appears. A "page" is a screen of information. Viewers
may then view the information they want by flipping to the page where
the desired material appears.
2
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. The Commission defines "teletext" as a "new form of radio communication that in-
volves the transmission of textual and graphic data on the vertical blanking interval of the
video portion of the television signal." Amendment to the Commission's Rules to Authorize
the Transmission of Teletext by Television Stations, 48 Fed. Reg. 27,054, 27,054 (1983) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 2,3,74) [hereinafter Teletext Order]. The vertical blanking interval is
that portion of the television signal that appears as a black bar when the picture rolls. Id. For
a detailed technical analysis of teletext, see J. TYDEMAN, H. LIPINSKI, R. ADLER, M. NYHAN
& L. ZWIMPFER, TELETEXT AND VIDEOTEXT IN THE UNITED STATES (1982). For a general
discussion of teletext, see Swillinger, Candidates and the New Technologies: Should Political
Broadcasting Rules Apply?, 49 Mo. L. REv. 85, 94-98 (1984); Note, The Future of Teletext:
Legal Implications of the FCC Deregulation of Electronic Publishing, 70 IowA L. REv. 709,
709 (1985) (authored by W. Scott Simmer). This Note only addresses broadcasted teletext.
Teletext may also be disseminated via cable or telephone wires.
2. Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 801 F.2d 501, 503, reh g denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 3196 (1987) [hereinafter TRAC].
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Closed caption for the hearing impaired is one example of a teletext ser-
vice. Teletext services may also provide information such as news,
sports, weather forecasts, comparative shopping prices, entertainment
schedules, and business-oriented information. 3
Although teletext has been in use in other countries for a number of
years and in the United States on an experimental basis since 1979, 4 the
Commission only recently declared teletext exempt from political broad-
casting regulations.5 Broadcasters naturally greeted this "hands-off" ap-
proach to teletext content regulation with elation, 6 while others just as
naturally condemned it, arguing that the absence of government protec-
tion would impair the public's need to obtain the full, fair story. Disa-
greement between these two viewpoints led to the recent decision in
Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission (TRAC), 7 in which the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia partially overturned the Commission's determination
that no political broadcasting regulations apply to teletext.
The TRAC court should have completely overturned the Commis-
sion's rulings on teletext. Although based on persuasive reasoning, the
decision suffers from fundamental legal and practical problems. Teletext
is defined as "broadcasting" by the Commission and the courts; conse-
quently, the law in effect when TRAC was decided demands that teletext
broadcasters be subject to the political broadcasting regulations of
(1) reasonable access, (2) equal opportunity, and (3) balanced presenta-
tion of issues of public importance. Section I discusses these three polit-
ical broadcasting regulations and the Commission's interpretation of
them in nonteletext circumstances. Section II outlines the Commission's
teletext content rulings and then section III discusses the TRAC court's
disposition of these rulings. Section IV analyzes the court's reasoning.
Section IV concludes that the TRAC decision improperly exempted
teletext from two of the political broadcasting regulations. Section V dis-
cusses the significant issues that will shape the future of teletext. Finally,
section VI proposes a method for addressing the necessary changes in the
content regulation of teletext and other forms of broadcasting.
3. Teletext Order, supra note 1, at 27,054.
4. AN INTRODUCTION TO ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING 60 (H. Look ed. 1983); see also R.
NEUSTADT, THE BIRTH OF ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING 19-22 (1982) (describing the develop-
ment of teletext in this country and others).
5. Teletext Order, supra note I, at 27,061. "Political broadcasting regulations" is a ge-
neric phrase for the three principal content rules applicable to broadcast licensees. See infra
notes 8-37 and accompanying text.
6. Carlson, New Age Front Page, 3 CAL. LAW., June 1983, at 14.
7. 801 F.2d 501, reh'g denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3196 (1987).
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I. Political Broadcasting Regulations
In contrast to the first amendment protection of newspapers and
other forms of written communication, regulation of radio and television
has existed in one form or another since Congress passed the Radio Act
of 1927.8 Passage of both the Radio Act and the Communications Act of
19349 was a necessary congressional reaction to the "massive reality" of
interference with frequencies and the "chaos [that had] ensued from per-
mitting anyone to use any frequency at whatever power level he
wished."10 Broadcasters themselves requested regulation because the
need was so obvious and so great.1"
The first requirement of broadcast regulations is that broadcasters
must obtain licenses to use the airwaves. Approved licensees receive ac-
cess rights. Access rights are not without cost, however, as the regula-
tions also impose certain content restrictions. Originally considered part
of the general mandate imposed by the "public interest, needs and
desires" licensing standard,12 three content ("political") regulations, out-
lined in the Communications Act, affected broadcasters at the time of the
TRAC decision and will be of importance in the future.1 3 These regula-
tions require broadcasters to provide equal and reasonable access to
political candidates and to issues of importance in the community. The
following subsections describe the specific requirements of the
regulations.
A. Reasonable Access
Congress passed the "reasonable access" provision of section
312(a)(7) 14 as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
8. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a),
48 Stat. 1064, 1102 (current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982)). The Communications
Act of 1934 created the Federal Communications Commission and gave it broadcast regula-
tory powers.
9. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982).
10. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 388
(1969).
11. E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 9 (2d ed.
1978).
12. Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,765, 33,769
(1978) [hereinafter Enforcing Section 312(a)(7)].
13. The reasonable access and equal time provisions have been codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(a)(7) (1982) and § 315 (1982), respectively. It is unclear whether Congress intended to
codify the fairness doctrine in § 315, and the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
issue. The TRAC court held that the doctrine was not codified. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 517; see
infra text accompanying notes 128-63 for an analysis of the TRAC holding on this issue.
14, Section 312(a)(7) provides:
(a) The Commission may revoke any station license or construction permit... (7)
for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of
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(FECA).15 The purpose of FECA, and thus of section 312(a)(7), was "to
give [federal] candidates for public office greater access to the media so
that they may better explain their stand on the issues, and thereby more
fully and completely inform the voters." 6 Prior to FECA's passage, the
Commission had imposed some obligations on broadcasters under the
general public interest mandate. In FECA, Congress created new access
obligations.' 7 Specifically, section 312(a)(7) authorized the Commission
to revoke a broadcaster's license for failure to respond adequately to a
candidate's reasonable access requests.
Congress gave the Commission the power to establish rules and reg-
ulations to guide broadcasters in determining what type and level of ac-
cess is "reasonable" under section 312(a)(7).18 As the Supreme Court
stated, Congress "essentially adopted a 'rule of reason' and charged the
[Commission] with its enforcement."' 9 The Commission has declined to
specifically define "reasonable access," relying instead on the reasonable,
good faith discretion of individual licensees. 20 Aside from these general
concepts, few formal rules guide a broadcaster's determination of "rea-
sonable access."'2' Broadcasters must review the request considering the
individual candidate's needs and demands, and must be ready to explain
any refusal to grant time.2 2 In the face of first amendment worries,
23
reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified
candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy.
47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982).
15. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 103(a)(2)(A), 86 Stat. 4 (1972).
16. 117 CONG. REC. 28,792 (1971) (statement of Sen. Pastore).
17. "Under the pre-[FECA] ... public interest requirement, . . .some time had to be
given to political issues, but an individual candidate could claim no personal right of access
unless his opponent used the station." Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Federal Communica-
tions Comm'n, 453 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1981).
18. Id. at 386 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1982)).
19. Id.
20. Cf id. at 414 (White, J., dissenting) (the Commission does not rely on the reasonable,
good faith discretion of individual licensees, but rather relies on its own determination of what
is reasonable).
21. Enforcing Section 312(a)(7), supra note 12, at 33,770. Formal rules have been estab-
lished in some circumstances. For instance, the reasonable access provision requires broad-
casters to allow candidates to request and receive time in "prime time," the period of the
broadcast day in which there is maximum audience potential. Id. The Commission would
have to define "prime time" for teletext, based on an examination of all relevant facts. Broad-
casters must also provide varied access (access of different lengths at different times) and "spot
time." "Spots" are classes of time a licensee provides to any advertiser. They could be fixed-
position, preemptible, or run-of-schedule. The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecast-
ing, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,342, 36,384 (1978). Finally, an arbitrary "blanket" ban on the use of a
particular class or length of time is not reasonable. Enforcing Section 312(a)(7), supra note 12,
at 33,770.
22. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 453 U.S. 367, 387
(1981).
23. See First Amendment Clarification Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 22 Before the Sub-
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Congress continues to recognize section 312(a)(7).24
B. Equal Opportunity
The provisions of section 315 of the Communications Act25 impose
equal opportunity and lowest rate obligations upon broadcasters. Most
importantly with regard to teletext, "the basic purpose of section 315 [is]
to require equal treatment by broadcasters of all candidates for a particu-
lar public office once the broadcaster ma[kes] a facility available to any
one of the candidates."' 26 The congressional aim, therefore, was to pre-
vent discrimination between competing candidates. Providing informa-
tion to the electorate was a less important additional benefit.27
The equal opportunity provisions of section 315 will apply only if
the candidate shows that there are two legally qualified and opposing
candidates, 28 a broadcasting station,29 and a "use," defined as a personal
comm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1978).
24. The Senate has considered § 312(a)(7) several times, but has produced only minor
amendments. See, e.g., S. 22, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1977); S. 1178, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2 (1975).
25. Section 315 provides:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station....
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters...
from the obligation . . . to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable
opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982).
26. Kennedy for President Comm., 46 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1659, 1660 (1980) (quoting
S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1959)).
27. S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1959).
28. The person appearing must be a legally qualified candidate at the time of the appear-
ance, and the candidate requesting the equal time must be legally qualified at the time of the
opponent's appearance. Flory v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 528 F.2d 124, 129 (7th
Cir. 1975). A person is a legally qualified candidate if he
1) has publicly announced his candidacy, 2) meets the qualifications prescribed by
applicable law to hold office, and 3) has qualified for a place on the ballot. A person
who has not qualified for a place on the ballot may still be considered a legally quali-
fied candidate if he meets requirements 1) and 2) above [and] if he is eligible under
applicable law to be voted for by write-in and he has either been nominated by a
political party commonly regarded as such, or he makes a substantial showing that
he is a bona fide candidate.
Id. at 130. Furthermore, the equal time obligation applies even if the "use" by a candidate is
not a political one, as long as the candidate is legally qualified. See Paulsen v. Federal Com-
munications Comm'n, 491 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1974) (professional entertainer who was
also a legally qualified candidate subjected a broadcast station to equal time provisions even
though his "use" was "nonpolitical"); see also Adrian Weiss Productions, 36 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 292 (1976) (the broadcast of movies starring Ronald Reagan when he was running for
office constituted a "use" although void of political content).
29. See infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
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appearance by a legally qualified candidate by voice or picture.30 If a
candidate meets these requirements, the broadcaster must provide her
equal opportunity to use the station.
C. Fairness Doctrine
The "fairness doctrine" is a two-pronged test that was originally de-
veloped by the Commission 31 to satisfy the "public interest" mandate
contained in the Communications Act of 1934.32 The two prongs require
licensees (1) to cover controversial issues of public importance fairly by
providing candidates with an opportunity to present contrasting points of
view and (2) to devote a reasonable amount of broadcast time to the
coverage of public issues.
33
The [Commission] has . . . recognized the necessity for licensees to
devote a reasonable percentage of their broadcast time to the presenta-
tion of news and programs devoted to the consideration and discussion
of public issues of interest in the community served by the particular
station... [and has recognized] the paramount right of the public in a
free society to be informed and to have presented to it for acceptance
or rejection the different attitudes and viewpoints concerning these vi-
tal and often controversial issues which are held by the various groups
which make up the community.
34
No individual has a personal right to present a viewpoint on the air,
and any time provided for discussion of an issue of public importance
does not have to be equally divided between viewpoints, as long as the
contrasting viewpoints are relatively well-balanced. 35
The Commission has recently declared the fairness doctrine uncon-
30. The Commission's definition of "use" is refined as necessary to meet the needs of each
new broadcasting medium. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text. A radio "use" may
be found when a candidate's name or recognizable voice is aired; a television "use" may be
found when a recognizable picture of a candidate appears on the screen.
31. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1985); for further development of the doctrine, see In re Edito-
rializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) [hereinafter 1949 Fairness Report];
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,372 (1974) [hereinafter
1974 Fairness Report]; General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 50 Fed.
Reg. 35,418 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Fairness Report]. The Commission recently declared the
doctrine unconstitutional. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH Syracuse,
New York, FCC 87-266-37141 (FCC, Aug. 4, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 Fairness Report] (for a
summary of the Commission's opinion see 52 Fed. Reg. 37,768 (1987)).
32. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 303(r), 309(h) (1982).
33. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine, 36 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1021, 1026 (1976).
34. 1949 Fairness Report, supra note 31, at 1249. See infra notes 126-63 and accompany-
ing text for further analysis of the fairness doctrine.
35. "There is no mathematical formula or mechanical requirement for achieving Fair-
ness, nor is equal time required. The principal test is 'whether the public is left uninformed.'"
Citizens to Tax Big Oil, 47 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1046, 1047 (1980) (citations omitted). A five
to one ratio, "without more, does not appear to be reasonable." Radio Station KKHI, 47 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 839, 840 (1980).
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stitutional. 36 The Commission therefore will not enforce the doctrine un-
less reversed by the Supreme Court. Congressional efforts to codify the
doctrine in a constitutionally valid form are likely, however.37 Thus, the
fairness doctrine may continue to be an important aspect of future polit-
ical broadcasting law.
II. The Commission's Teletext Rulings
The Commission first authorized broadcasters to use the vertical
blanking interval for teletext transmittal on May 20, 1983.38 Although
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking had barely mentioned content regu-
lation,39 the Teletext Order completely exempted teletext from any con-
tent regulation.
A. Reasonable Access and Equal Opportunity
The Teletext Order concluded that "as a matter of law," the reason-
able access and equal opportunity requirements "need not be applied to
teletext service."'' The Commission reasoned that the section 312(a)(7)
reasonable access requirements may be satisfied by allowing federal can-
didates access to a licensee's regular broadcast operation and does not
require access to ancillary or subsidiary service offerings like teletext.
Further, because teletext is ancillary and will not provide access to the
broad television audience attracted to the station's regular broadcast op-
eration, the Commission concluded it was not unreasonable to refuse ac-
cess to teletext. Finally, the Commission reasoned that since section 315
requires a broadcast "use" by a candidate, and teletext is not capable of a
"use," the Communications Act's guidelines are inapplicable. 41
In its summary, the Commission stated that "because of teletext's
unique characteristics as a print medium and an ancillary service of
broadcasting, we think application of these provisions [sections 312(a)(7)
36. 52 Fed. Reg. 31,768 (1987).
37. Praise and Denunciation Greets Ruling by F. C.C., N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at C26,
col. 3 (city ed.) (quoting Rep. Edward J. Markey (D. Mass.)).
38. Teletext Order, supra note 1. The Notice of Proposed Rule Making preceding this
authorization may be found at 46 Fed. Reg. 60,851 (1981) [hereinafter Notice of Proposed
Rule Making].
39. The only possible reference to content regulation was found in paragraph 17, which
reads:
To be consistent with the theme of maximum freedom for licensees, teletext would be
treated as an ancillary service. Stations would not be required to observe service
guidelines or other performance standards. The only restriction on activities using
the vertical interval would be that they adhere to the definitional limitations for
teletext described below.
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 38, at 60,853.
40. Teletext Order, supra note 1, at 27,061.
41. Id. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition of
.,se." )
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and 315] to teletext is both unnecessary and unwise as a matter of
policy."42
B. The Fairness Doctrine
The Commission also concluded that the fairness doctrine should
not apply to teletext services, because "teletext's unique blending of the
print medium with radio technology fundamentally distinguishes it from
traditional broadcast programming. '43 It further found that the scarcity
rationale,44 traditionally used to explain the abrogation of broadcasters'
first amendment rights, did not apply to teletext because it did not have
the requisite immediacy of broadcasting.
45
III. The TRAC Decision
The TRAC court presented its opinion in five parts. After discuss-
ing the Commission rulings that led to the dispute over content regula-
tion of teletext, the court outlined the first amendment status of
broadcasting in general and of teletext in particular. After concluding
that teletext is a form of broadcasting, the court determined that the rea-
sonable access and fairness doctrine regulations should not apply to
teletext, but that the equal opportunity regulations should apply to
teletext.
A. Teletext: "Print" or "Broadcasting"?
According to the court, the first amendment status of teletext de-
pends on whether it is "print" or "broadcasting." Two landmark
Supreme Court communications cases created the legal distinction: Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission,46 and
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.47 In Red Lion, the Supreme
Court found that because airwaves are scarce, the Commission may regu-
late the content of broadcasters' programs without violating their first
amendment rights. In Tornillo, decided only five years later, the
Supreme Court held that print communicators, such as newspapers, are
entitled to great first amendment protection and are not subject to con-
tent regulation. Whether Red Lion or Tornillo applies to teletext is im-
portant, for "if Tornillo rather than Red Lion applies to teletext, that
service is entitled to greater first amendment protection than ordinary
broadcasting and it would be proper, at a minimum, to construe political
42. Teletext Order, supra note 1, at 27,061.
43. Id. at 27,062.
44. See infra notes 74-79 and 164-73 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
scarcity doctrine.
45. Teletext Order, supra note 1, at 27,062.
46. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
47. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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broadcasting provisions narrowly to avoid constitutionally suspect
results.
'48
The court found that teletext is subject to Red Lion's limited first
amendment protection because teletext is a form of broadcasting. The
court reasoned that "teletext, whatever its similarities to print media,
uses broadcast frequencies, and that, given Red Lion, would seem to be
that."
49
In reaching its conclusion, the court expressed dissatisfaction with
the "unusable" distinction between print and broadcast media. 50 The
court clearly believed that broadcasters should enjoy full first amend-
ment rights,51 but found that stare decisis required it not only to distin-
guish between the two types of communication media, but also to place
teletext in the category of broadcasting.
B. Reasonable Access
Because of the narrow scope of judicial review of administrative de-
cision-making, the court made only a limited determination of whether
the reasonable access requirements of section 312(a)(7) apply to teletext.
The Commission has been delegated by Congress the primary responsi-
bility of establishing rules and regulations to guide broadcasters in deter-
mining what access is reasonable under section 312(a)(7).52 As the
Supreme Court stated, Congress "essentially adopted a 'rule of reason'
and charged the [Commission] with its enforcement.153 Once the Com-
mission makes a determination in a particular situation regarding reason-
able access, its decision is "given controlling weight unless [it is]
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. '54
Using the deferential "rule of reason" standard, the Commission
concluded that, with respect to teletext and section 312(a)(7), a broad-
48. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 507.
49. Id. at 509. For an analysis of the definition of broadcasting, see infra notes 80-91 and
accompanying text.
50. The court referred to the "deficiencies of the scarcity rationale," the doctrine that has
been used to explain regulation of broadcasting. It also called the "line drawn between the
print media and the broadcast media.., a distinction without a difference." TRAC, 801 F.2d
at 501. This distinction has been criticized by others as well. See Fowler & Brenner, A Mar-
ketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 207, 221-26 (1982); see also R.
NEUSTADT, supra note 4, at 38-39; I. DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 243-44
(1983); Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 224.
51. In its criticism of the scarcity doctrine, the opinion expressed the hope that one day
the Supreme Court would "revisit this area of the law and ... eliminate the distinction be-
tween print and broadcast media, surely by pronouncing Tornillo applicable to both.
TRAC, 801 F.2d at 509 (emphasis added).
52. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 453 U.S. 367, 386
(1981).
53. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1982)).
54. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 510 (citation omitted).
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caster does not act unreasonably by adopting a policy of refusing to per-
mit a candidate any access to teletext.55  Thus, the Commission
embraced an absolute rule that does not depend on the circumstances of
the individual case: regardless of the identity of the licensee and the can-
didate, the Commission will not find that a licensee has acted unreasona-
bly by not allowing access to teletext. This ruling simply exempts
teletext from section 312(a)(7) requirements.
The court classified this rule as a per se rule, and found that per se
rules are acceptable for two reasons. First, "within a rule of reason ...
there are ... cases at the extremities of the spectrum where reasonable-
ness or unreasonableness is clear. Thus, there are areas of per se legality
and illegality within any rule of reason. ' '56 Second, the per se approach is
consistent with the Commission policy toward section 312(a)(7) that has
been approved by the Supreme Court. The court cited two examples as
support: (1) the Supreme Court had already approved a Commission-
adopted per se rule limiting the reasonable access requirement to the pe-
riod after a campaign commences; 57 and (2) the Commission used a per
se approach when it exempted subscription television stations from sec-
tion 312(a)(7).
58
After finding that a per se approach is generally acceptable, the
court reviewed the teletext decision to determine whether the ruling was
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. The court
found that the Commission's decision implied that use of teletext was
unnecessary to provide reasonable access because that need may be satis-
fied by resort to the main channel. Because the court was unable to find
that such a conclusion was irrational, it could not overturn the Commis-
sion's decision not to apply section 312(a)(7) to teletext.5
9
C. Equal Opportunity
The court did overturn the Commission's determination that the
section 315 equal opportunity provisions do not apply to teletext. Ac-
cording to the court, because teletext is broadcasting and therefore capa-
ble of a "use," section 315 must apply.60
The court, in finding that teletext is broadcasting, rejected the Com-
mission's characterization of teletext as an ancillary service that need not
55. Rules to Authorize the Transmission of Teletext by Television Stations, 50 Fed. Reg.
4678, 4681 (1985).
56. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 512.
57. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 453 U.S. 367, 388-
90 (1981).
58. Because subscription television is geared to selective audiences, the court reasoned
that the purpose behind § 312(a)(7) would not be met by forcing subscription television broad-
casters to provide reasonable access. Enforcing Section 312(a)(7), supra note 12, at 33,772.
59. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 513.
60. Id. at 513-14.
[Vol. 39
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be subject to traditional broadcasting regulation. "Teletext and main
channel broadcasting are merely different time intervals within the
broadcast spectrum. Teletext is 'ancillary' to main channel broadcasting
only in the sense that it will probably not attract nearly as many
viewers."
61
The court similarly faulted the Commission's analysis of whether
teletext is capable of a "use" within the meaning of section 315. The
court called for expansion of the Commission's definition of "use" to in-
clude teletext. 62 The current definition, the court reasoned, "suggests an
approach under which the [Commission] defines 'use' according to the
qualities of the medium being used." 63 Implicitly the court found that
the current definition of "use" was developed for radio and television.
Because teletext is a different medium with unique characteristics, the
court would require the Commission to redefine "use" to include teletext
broadcasting.
D. The Fairness Doctrine
The final part of the TRAC opinion dealt with the relationship of the
fairness doctrine to teletext. The court preliminarily determined that be-
cause teletext is broadcasting, the terms of the fairness doctrine should
apply. Thus, unless the Commission adequately explained its refusal to
apply the doctrine to teletext, the court must overturn its decision.
The Commission, however, had determined it was under no obliga-
tion to extend the fairness doctrine to new services like teletext because
Congress, in the Commission's opinion, never codified the fairness doc-
trine. The court wholeheartedly agreed with this contention and found
that the Commission is bound only by the public interest mandate, the
backbone of the Federal Communications Act.64
The Commission's conclusion that since the fairness doctrine was
never codified, it need not be applied to new services like teletext, repre-
sented a change in the Commission's view of what the public interest
mandate requires. Because an agency must conform to its own precedent
or explain any departure from it,65 the court required a specific justifica-
61. Id. at 514. For an explanation of why teletext is broadcasting, see infra notes 80-91
and accompanying text.
62. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 515. Teletext is capable of high resolution graphics which can
produce an identifiable voice or picture of a candidate. Examples of teletext graphics capabili-
ties are on file with The Hastings Law Journal. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text
for an explanation of a "use."
63. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 515.
64. Id. at 517-18 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 409 (1982)).
65. In support of the proposition that changing Commission viewpoints must be justified,
the court cited Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 444
F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); see also infra note 161 and
accompanying text.
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tion as to why the fairness doctrine did not apply to teletext.
The Commission argued that it should avoid impeding the develop-
ment of a new technology. The court accepted this explanation, finding
that the Commission had "acted rationally in... concluding" that appli-
cation of the fairness doctrine obligations would impede the development
of teletext.
66
IV. Teletext and the Political Broadcasting Regulations
It is obvious that the thoughtful and organized TRAC opinion, writ-
ten by Circuit Judge Robert Bork and joined by then Circuit Judge
Antonin Scalia, 67 tried to reach a comfortable balance between current
law and the marketplace approach generally favored by both Judge Bork
and Justice Scalia. Judge Bork, a conservative, faced a very difficult situ-
ation. As a Chicago-school theorist, Judge Bork would probably prefer
to see most, if not all, regulations surrounding communications repealed
to allow the marketplace to take charge.68 As a positivist,69 however, he
felt compelled to look only to written law and Supreme Court opinions.
Consequently, because the Supreme Court has determined that broad-
casters have limited first amendment rights, Judge Bork was restricted
from allowing the marketplace to control the communications industry.
The TRAC opinion reflected this dilemma. The result is slightly
schizophrenic, as the court disapproved regulation with respect to the
fairness doctrine and the reasonable access provisions, yet strictly abided
by the statutory law regarding equal opportunity. The result is also a
relatively satisfactory balance. The logic of the opinion fails, however,
when one recognizes that, because teletext is not so different from regular
broadcasting, political broadcasting regulations should not be applied
differently to teletext than to standard forms of broadcasting.
This section will argue that all the political broadcasting regulations
should apply to teletext. First, it will outline the different treatment that
broadcasting and print media receive from the Commission and the
courts. While the print medium is "free press" that is not subject to
content regulation, the broadcast medium has always been subject to
66. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 518.
67. Senior Circuit Judge George MacKinnon concurred in part and dissented in part. He
would apply all political broadcasting regulations to teletext, and not just § 315 equal time
requirements. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 519.
68. This view coincides with the wishes of the recent Commission chairman, Mark
Fowler, and of the Commission itself. See Bazelon, supra note 50, at 224; Fowler & Brenner,
supra note 50, at 221; see also infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text for an analysis of the
marketplace theory of regulation.
69. See Dworkin, Law's Ambition for Itself, 71 VA. L. REV. 173, 182 (1985) (Dworkin
uses Bork as an example of a positivist, or one who believes judges should only interpret, and
not make law); see also 111 BROADCASTING, Dec. 22, 1986, at 39, 41 (Judge Bork is "known
for his view that the courts should not attempt to strike out on policy forays of their own.").
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political content regulation. Although the rationale behind this distinc-
tion is no longer as convincing as it was when the Supreme Court first
approved content regulation of broadcasting, the distinction and thus the
regulations remain legally valid today. Second, this section will' prove
that teletext is a form of broadcasting. Because teletext is broadcasting,
it should be subject to the political broadcasting regulations of reasonable
access, and, if codified, the fairness doctrine. Although the TRAC court
agreed that teletext is broadcasting and thus potentially subject to the
regulations, it determined that teletext licensees do not have to abide by
reasonable access and fairness doctrine requirements. This section ex-
plains why the court was wrong in that conclusion.
A. The First Amendment and the Scarcity Doctrine
The purpose of applying the first amendment in the communications
field is "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail."' 70 To realize that purpose, the Supreme Court
has distinguished print communications from broadcasting communica-
tions in first amendment jurisprudence. A brief discussion of these two
areas of law is necessary to highlight that distinction.
(1) Print Communicators' First Amendment Rights
The Supreme Court described first amendment rights in print com-
munication as a "marketplace of ideas" in Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo.71 Tornillo involved a newspaper that refused to print a candi-
date's replies to editorials that were critical of the candidate. The candi-
date sued the newspaper based on a state "right to reply" statute that
granted a political candidate a right to equal space in that newspaper to
answer criticism and attacks on his record. In holding the state statute
unconstitutional, the Court recognized that "[ilt has yet to be demon-
strated how governmental regulation of [the] crucial [editorial] process
can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free
press."' 72 Thus, Tornillo highlights the publisher's almost absolute right
to free speech concerning matters of public importance. 73
(2) Broadcasters' First Amendment Rights
a. The Scarcity Doctrine
The Supreme Court approved the policies and constitutional ration-
ale behind political broadcasting regulations in the landmark case of Red
70. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969).
71. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
72. Id. at 258.
73. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940).
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Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission.74 In Red
Lion, the Court found that broadcasters' first amendment rights may be
abrogated, even though "broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a
First Amendment interest, [because] differences in the characteristics of
new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied
to them."
'75
The constitutional distinction between broadcasting and print owes
to the scarcity of radio frequencies. 76 The Supreme Court explained the
"scarcity doctrine" in Red Lion:
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permit-
ted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should
be expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain
their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have
the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the
First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
77
In Red Lion, the Supreme Court approved the scarcity doctrine as a
justification for content regulation by the federal government. 78 Red
Lion thus stands for the proposition that the federal government may
abridge broadcasters' first amendment rights to political speech through
statutory and administrative regulation.
The Supreme Court decided Red Lion before teletext was developed.
Nevertheless, the TRA C court determined that Red Lion applies to
teletext because it found that teletext is a form of broadcasting.
79
b. Teletext is a Form of Broadcasting
A review of the definition of broadcasting clearly shows that teletext
is a form of broadcasting. Broadcasting is "the dissemination of radio
communications intended to be received by the public."'80 Radio com-
munication is in turn defined as "the transmission of writing, signs, sig-
nals, pictures and sounds of all kinds, including all ...services ...
incidental to such transmission."8 ' Teletext meets the requirements of
broadcasting in two ways. First, teletext involves the transmittal of writ-
74. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
75. Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 390. The Supreme Court first delineated the "scarcity doctrine" in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 109 (1943).
77. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
78. Although it dealt only with the fairness doctrine, Red Lion recognized that the equal-
time provision of § 315 was "indistinguishable" in terms of constitutional principle from the
fairness doctrine. 395 U.S. at 391. Subsequent cases have recognized that Red Lion applies
with equal force to the reasonable access provisions of § 312(a)(7). See, e.g., Columbia Broad-
casting Sys. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981).
79. See TRAC, 801 F.2d at 509.
80. 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1982).
81. Id. § 153(b).
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ing, signs, signals, and pictures. The inability to produce sound does not
remove teletext from the confines of broadcasting. If all the requirements
identified had to be met (writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds) for
a technology to constitute broadcasting neither teletext nor radio would
be broadcasting. Such a result clearly would be contrary to the legisla-
tive intent of the Communications Act since the principal phrase used in
the statute is radio communication.
82
Teletext meets a second requirement of the broadcasting defini-
tion-broadcasting must be intended to be received by the public.
8 3
Although teletext is ordinarily used to provide only specific audiences
with information,8 4 teletext may also be used to provide information to
the general public.8 5 As the TRAC court stated, "an intent for public
distribution exists when the licensee's programming can be, 'and is, of
interest to the general.., audience.' "86 Finally, although viewers must
purchase a decoder to receive teletext, it is still broadcasting: "broad-
casting remains broadcasting even though a segment of the public is un-
able to view programs without special equipment.
87
The problem with the court's opinion is its failure to recognize that
teletext is not only broadcasting; it is also print.8 Although the Supreme
Court has not yet been confronted with this hybrid situation, it is un-
likely a court would determine that everything that is broadcasting auto-
matically would be subject to all broadcasting regulations without more
analysis than that provided by the TRAC court. A court analyzing this
issue in the future, however, could rely on one or both of two persuasive
explanations for treating teletext as broadcasting even though it may also
be classisified as print.
First, a brief review of Red Lion shows that the TRAC court arrived
at the correct result in deciding that teletext is a form of broadcasting.
Red Lion stated that section 315 is valid as an "obligation of the licen-
see."'89 In other words, political broadcasting regulations are obligations
that attach because licensing is necessary, not because the information
82. See id. § 153(o).
83. Id. This requirement is also known as the "Functional Music Test," after Functional
Music, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 274 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
84. Examples of such services include financial reports and closed caption for the hearing
impaired.
85. For example, teletext may broadcast news, weather, and classified ads.
86. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 515 (citing Functional Music, 274 F.2d at 548) (emphasis
omitted).
87. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 740 F.2d 1190,
1201 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Further Notice in the Matter of Subscription Television Serv., 3
F.C.C. 2d 1, 9-10 (1966)).
88. Eventually, teletext will provide all the services offered by newspapers. R. NEU-
STADT, supra note 4, at 8.
89. Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 391
(1969).
November 1987] THE TRWC TO FAIRNESS
itself is broadcast. Since the licensing of teletext operators is necessary to
transmit teletext over broadcast wires, the political broadcasting regula-
tions applicable to other types of broadcast licensees should also apply to
teletext licensees.
A second explanation for treating teletext as broadcasting is found
in another case decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit. In National Association of Broadcasters v. Federal Com-
munications Commission,90 the court considered the Commission
decision to exempt certain Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) services from
political broadcast regulations. The court held that the Commission's
discretion to deal with new technologies "is not boundless: the Commis-
sion has no authority to experiment with its statutory obligations." 91
Thus, the Commission could not exempt DBS services from the political
broadcasting regulations, even though it was a new broadcasting technol-
ogy different from standard broadcasting. Similarly, the Commission
should not exempt teletext from the regulations, because teletext is also a
form of broadcasting. Using either or both of these explanations, the
TRAC court correctly determined that teletext is a form of broadcasting
and the political broadcasting regulations should apply.
c. Pervasive Presence Theory
The TRA C court utilized the scarcity doctrine to justify application
of the political broadcasting regulations to teletext. Although the scarcity
doctrine has been the principal explanation for content regulation since
Red Lion, the court did not address an alternative rationale that may
have Supreme Court support: the "pervasive presence" theory. The
Supreme Court first addressed the pervasive presence theory in Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation.92 Pacifica involved
an afternoon radio broadcast of George Carlin's satiric monologue,
"Filthy Words." Although the station preceded the broadcast with a
warning that vulgar language would follow, a father and his young son
heard only the monologue, not the warning. The father complained to
the Commission which ruled that the "patently offensive" language of
the monologue was proscribed by the federal statute forbidding indecent
broadcasting.
93
The Supreme Court upheld the Commission's ruling after finding
that the first amendment right to free speech was applicable. Recognizing
that "each medium of expression presents special First Amendment
problems,"' 94 the Court endorsed the distinction between broadcasting
90. 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
91. Id. at 1200-01.
92. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
93. See id. at 732 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982)).
94. Id. at 748 (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1972)).
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and print regulation as a product of the "uniquely pervasive presence...
in the lives of all Americans" that broadcasting occupies.95
With the Pacifica holding ringing in its ears, the Commission stated
in its Teletext Order that "[i]mplicit in the 'scarcity' rationale... is an
assumption that broadcasters... possess a power to communicate ideas
through sound and visual images in a manner that is significantly differ-
ent from traditional avenues of communication because of the immediacy
of the medium."'9
6
The TRAC court refused to accept such reasoning, declaring that
"we are unwilling to endorse an argument that makes the very effective-
ness of speech the justification for according it less first amendment pro-
tection."' 97 Although it appears that the TRAC court incorrectly decided
this issue in light of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Pacifica, there are
two very persuasive explanations for the court's refusal to accept this
argument.
First, the Commission has stated that immediacy is implicit in the
scarcity doctrine, however, nowhere in Pacifica does the Supreme Court
link the two theories. Instead, the Court discusses the different treatment
broadcasters are accorded compared with publishers, and then gives the
pervasive presence doctrine, rather than the scarcity doctrine, as an ex-
planation. The court in TRAC is also careful to make this distinction.
98
Second, the Pacifica pervasive presence doctrine may be limited to
the facts of that particular case. The Supreme Court itself had empha-
sized the narrowness of its holding;99 it did not discuss the scarcity doc-
trine at all. Thus the TRAC court likely was addressing only a particular
problem, not a totally new broadcasting theory.
Given the limitations of using the pervasive presence theory, the
court's decision not to apply it makes sense. Even without these limita-
tions, however, the pervasive presence theory does not correspond to
teletext technology. Because teletext is not capable of sound reproduc-
tion, the pervasiveness of teletext is more similar to print than broadcast-
ing. Unlike television or radio, a child cannot sit in a room and be
bombarded with information without paying attention. The child, or
anyone else, must actively be involved in obtaining the information: she
must read it. Thus, even if the pervasive presence theory had been raised
in TRAC, the court should not have supported it.
The scarcity doctrine nevertheless applies to broadcasting in general
95. Id. The other explanation endorsed for the distinction dealt with the fact that broad-
casting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Id. at 749.
96. Teletext Order, supra note 1, at 27,062 (emphasis added).
97. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 508.
98. "[IThe Supreme Court's articulation of the scarcity doctrine contains no hint of any
immediacy rationale." Id. (emphasis added).
99. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978).
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and because teletext is broadcasting, Red Lion requires that the political
broadcasting regulations apply to teletext. As the TRAC court suc-
cinctly observed: "Teletext is broadcasting, and that, given Red Lion,
would seem to be that."'' 1 As discussed in section V, the scarcity doc-
trine appears to be obsolete, and as soon as Congress or the Commission
gives the Supreme Court an indication of the doctrine's obsolescence,
perhaps the hopes reflected in TRAC will be realized, and broadcasters
will receive first amendment rights similar to those currently afforded
print publishers. Finally, the pervasive presence theory also could not
provide an alternative rationale for broadcast regulation of teletext in
TRA C, because teletext does not have the requisite pervasiveness.
B. Reasonable Access Provisions--Section 312(a)(7)
The TRAC court accepted the Commission's ruling that it is reason-
able for a broadcaster to adopt a per se rule providing that teletext access
will not be available to political candidates under the section 312(a)(7)
reasonable access provisions. 10 1 Even agreeing with the court's recogni-
tion that the review of the agency's construction of section 312(a)(7)
should be accorded significant judicial deference, 0 2 the decision is mani-
festly contrary to statutory intent, case law, and logical reasoning.
(1) The Statute
The purpose of section 312(a)(7) is "to allow candidates to better
explain their stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and completely
inform the voters." 10 3 Even if a candidate is unable to access teletext, the
Commission claims that access to a licensee's regular broadcast operation
will adequately satisfy the requirements of section 312(a)(7). This view,
however, fails to meet the statutory purpose: a candidate may be "better
able to explain" her stand on the issues with access to teletext, and the
voters may be "more fully and completely" informed through teletext.
Because access to teletext would increase a voter's understanding of
political issues, candidates should be allowed access to teletext under sec-
tion 312(a)(7). Teletext allows a candidate to use screens of information
to explain the points she wishes to make. For instance, an entire speech
could be broadcast, with charts or graphs if desired. The viewer not only
could read the speech at his leisure, but could also reread parts that were
hard to understand or unclear, and could return to the speech if inter-
100. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 509.
101. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
102. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 510.
103. 117 CONG. REC. 28,792 (1971) (statement of Sen. Pastore). Congress did not specifi-
cally promulgate rules to guide the Commission interpretation and implementation of
§ 312(a)(7); thus the Commission rulings and guidelines provide the most important nonjudi-
cial basis for study.
[Vol. 39
rupted. If properly used, teletext could allow a candidate to explain her
stand on the issues in a very clear, precise manner that would be far
superior to an explanation made on television or radio. The voter, who
views teletext, could therefore be more fully and completely informed.
Furthermore, the Commission's proposed alternative of access to
the primary signal may not be available. If the station has already pro-
vided the opposing candidate with enough air time to satisfy the station's
reasonable access and equal opportunity requirements, it would have no
further obligation to afford access for the opponent to respond to oppos-
ing teletext programming. 1°4 It is possible that such an action may be
treated as "unreasonable" access. Since the Commission's policy has
"generally been to defer to the reasonable, good faith judgment of licen-
sees as to what constitutes 'reasonable access' under all the circumstances
present in a particular case,"' 1 5 however, the Commission probably
would rule that alternate access to the primary signal was reasonable.
In addition to endorsing the general purpose behind section
312(a)(7), the Commission has outlined specific guidelines for broadcast-
ers to follow: reasonable access requires that a candidate be afforded the
chance to purchase both programs and commercials during prime
time,'0 6 and a licensee may not flatly ban access to any of the classes and
lengths of time in periods offered to commercial advertisers.
Because teletext is a form of broadcasting, it automatically should
be subject to these guidelines even without any particularized rules.
Moreover, these guidelines clearly apply to teletext. Spot announce-
ments, a technique that many candidates have found to be the most effec-
tive way of reaching the voters,' 0 7 are ideal for teletext. Furthermore,
the Commission has stated that it "feel[s] certain that Congress in grant-
ing Federal candidates a specific right of access to a station wished such
candidates to be at least on par with commercial advertisers who have no
such access rights."108 Teletext is advertiser-supported, thus to be "on
par" with commercial advertisers, candidates should have access to
teletext.
The Commission failed to explain in its teletext decisions why it ex-
empted teletext from these general requirements developed for broad-
casters. Instead, the Commission defended its decision to ignore these
requirements by describing other situations in which a general rule was
104. Swillinger, supra note 1, at 95-96. The station also may have to provide time to
representatives under a quasi-fairness, quasi-equal opportunity doctrine. See infra notes 123-
25 and accompanying text. For a summary of Congressional intent in this matter, see supra
notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
105. Enforcing Section 312(a)(7), supra note 12, at 33,770.
106. Id. (citing 47 F.C.C. 516 (1974)). See supra note 21 for definitions of "prime time"
and "spot time."
107. Enforcing Section 312(a)(7), supra note 12, at 33,770.
108. Id.
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considered reasonable. A general rule that allows broadcasters to refuse
teletext access to political candidates under section 312(a)(7) does not
become reasonable by making an analogy to other general rules that have
been found to be reasonable. The court compounds this error by simi-
larly ignoring these general requirements. As a result, both the statutory
intent behind section 312(a)(7) and the corresponding Commission
guidelines were ignored by the court as well as the Commission.
(2) Precedent
The TRAC court also failed to follow the Supreme Court precedent
of Columbia Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion (CBS). 10 9 CBS dealt with a request by the Carter-Mondale Presi-
dential Committee for time to air a thirty-minute program. The
Committee provided four potential dates and requested time anywhere
within a two and one-half hour period in the evening on one of the dates.
The television network denied the request but offered to sell two five-
minute segments, one in the evening and one in the daytime. The Com-
mission found the network's response to be a breach of the reasonable-
ness standard, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, upholding
the Commission's policy and procedures developed to implement section
312(a)(7). The Court summarized the section 312(a)(7) requirements as
follows:
[R]equests must be considered on an individualized basis, and broad-
casters are required to tailor their responses to accommodate, as much
as reasonably possible, a candidate's stated purposes in seeking air
time. In responding to access requests, however, broadcasters may
also give weight to such factors as the amount of time previously sold
to the candidate, the disruptive impact on regular programming, and
the likelihood of requests for time by rival candidates under the equal
opportunities provision of § 315(a). These considerations may not be
invoked as pretexts for denying access; to justify a negative response,
broadcasters must cite a realistic danger of substantial program disrup-
tion-perhaps caused by insufficient notice to allow adjustments in the
schedule-or of an excessive number of equal time requests. Further,
in order to facilitate review by the Commission, broadcasters must ex-
plain their reasons for refusing time or making a more limited counter-
offer. If broadcasters take the appropriate factors into account and act
reasonably and in good faith, their decisions will be entitled to defer-
ence even if the Commission's analysis would have differed in the first
instance. But if broadcasters adopt "across-the-board policies" and do
not attempt to respond to the individualized situation of a particular
candidate, the Commission is not compelled to sustain their denial of
access. 110
109. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
110. Id. at 387-88.
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The TRAC court found no conflict between the CBS court's inter-
pretation of section 312(a)(7) and the Commission'§ refusal to apply sec-
tion 312(a)(7) to teletext. Instead, the court accepted the Commission's
determination that a blanket refusal of access to teletext is reasonable. 11
The problem with the TRAC decision is a basic failure to see the
forest for the trees. In its desire to help further the deregulation of
broadcasting,1 2 the TRAC court searched for and found a barely passa-
ble way around the law as stated by the Supreme Court in CBS. For
instance, the court upheld the Commission's per se rule because a candi-
date may have access to the main channel. This is a blatant refusal to
follow the CBS mandate that requests be considered on an individualized
basis. The court also ignores the requirement that broadcasters accom-
modate a candidate's stated purpose in seeking air time. According to
CBS, a candidate should have access to teletext if he wants to use it; yet
the TRAC decision removes that option. A candidate will therefore be
limited to use of the main channel. Consequently, this refusal not only is
a failure to respond to the individual needs of a candidate, but it may
mean the candidate will receive no air time at all.11
3
(3) A Logic Problem
Finally, the TRAC court's decision to exempt teletext from section
312(a)(7) and not from section 315 suffers from logical inconsistency. As
the court itself recognized, the sections are indistinguishable in terms of
constitutional principle.114 The sections are also indistinguishable in
their application to teletext. Both sections require a broadcasting station,
a legally qualified candidate, and a "use."' 1 5 The only procedural differ-
ence is that section 312(a)(7) applies only to federal candidates whereas
section 315 applies to all candidates. The two sections consistently have
been applied together with respect to television, radio, and direct broad-
cast satellites. 11 6 Teletext differs from each of those older technologies in
its power and method of communication. Nevertheless, teletext is a form
of broadcasting as are those other technologies, and that classification is
the principal criteria for the application of both section 312(a)(7) and
Ill. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 512.
112. See infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text for an analysis of the theory of market-
place regulation.
113. If access to the main channel has already been provided for the candidate, the licen-
see may not be required to provide more time. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
114. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 506 n.1 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communi-
cations Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969)).
115. "Since Section 315(b) applies only to 'uses' by a candidate, it is only logical that
Congress intended Section 312(a)(7) also to apply only to 'uses.' " Enforcing Section 312(a)(7),
supra note 12, at 33,770.
116. See National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 740 F.2d
1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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section 315. Although teletext may be affected by one section and not
another in a particular case, a general rule exempting licensees from pro-
viding section 312(a)(7) reasonable access while requiring section 315
equal opportunity is illogical.
Furthermore, the underlying purpose of both sections is to protect
the public's right to full and fair information. Section 312(a)(7) requires
broadcasters to provide reasonable access to candidates to "more fully
and completely inform the voters."1 17 Section 315 likewise has the goal
of informing the electorate.' 18 To fulfill these policy goals, both sections
should be enforced with respect to teletext. Otherwise, the public is not
fully and fairly informed because either candidates will have no right to
reasonable access (a candidate receives no right to time to present his
issues) or they will have an unbalanced right to access (a broadcast licen-
see allows access only to those with the broadcaster's point of view).
Legislative intent, Supreme Court decisions, and common sense all
dictate that teletext should be subject to section 312(a)(7). The TRAC
court's refusal to reverse the Commission on this issue is at least partially
caused by Judge Bork's general desire to deregulate broadcasting, rather
than his duty to present a reasoned, balanced analysis.
C. Equal Opportunity Provisions-Section 315
The court reached the correct conclusion in rejecting the Commis-
sion's determination that the "equal opportunity" provisions of section
315 should not apply to teletext. Section 315 requires that the technolog-
ical medium be a "use." The Commission has defined a "use" as follows:
"any broadcast ... of a candidate's voice or picture is a 'use' of a station
... if the candidate's participation in the program or announcement is
such that he will be identified by members of the audience."' 19
Teletext meets the Commission's definition. It is capable of high
resolution graphics so that a candidate would be identifiable by voice or
picture, as required. Furthermore, a candidate could buy a page or series
of pages of teletext to provide information that could be considered a
117. 117 CONG. REC. 28,792 (1971) (statement of Sen. Pastore).
118. S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1959).
119. The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,342, 36,359
(1978). Specifically, in determining how much of an appearance constitutes a "use," the Com-
mission has said:
In the case of spots, if a candidate makes any appearance in which he is identified or
identifiable by voice or picture, even if it is only to identify sponsorship of the spot,
the whole announcement will be considered a use. In the case of a program, the
entire program is a use if "the candidate's personal appearance is substantial in
length, integrally involved in the program, and indeed the focus of the program, and
where the program is under the control and direction of the candidate."
Id. at 36,362 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see supra note 30 for further explana-
tion of what constitutes a "use."
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"program or announcement." The frames would be under the candi-
date's control and the candidate would be the focus of the program,
meeting the definition of "use."
Even if teletext did not meet the above definition, the court is cor-
rect in concluding that the Commission should have redefined "use" to
account for teletext. The need to define "use" first arose with the intro-
duction of section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927,120 the predecessor to
section 315. Congress used the term "use," but did not define it, so the
Commission developed a working definition to enable them to apply the
statute. Since the only form of broadcasting then in existence was radio,
the original definition of "use" did not consider any visual "uses." As
the senator in charge of the original legislation recognized, however, the
understanding and application of a "use" could not be tied down to the
application needed in 1927: "You must leave it to the discretion of the
men who have charge and who will meet the changing conditions." 121
Accordingly, the definition of "use" was later revised to its present form
to include pictures of candidates such as those that can be seen on televi-
sion. Similarly, the Commission should now redefine "use" to cover the
special capabilities of teletext.
The definition of "use" could be amended to read as follows: If a
candidate makes any appearance in which he is identified or identifiable
by voice or picture or graphic design, the whole announcement will be
considered a "use." The addition of "graphic design" would appropri-
ately expand the definition of a "use" to include appearances on teletext
and would address the "changing conditions" to which the Commission
is expected to respond.
Teletext must also be subject to the Zapple rule. The Zapple rule is
a quasi-fairness, quasi-equal opportunity rule developed by the Commis-
sion to close a loophole in section 315. Because section 315 requires a
"use," and because a "use" only occurs if a candidate's recognizable
voice or picture appears in the program or announcement, a broadcasting
licensee could circumvent the equal opportunity and fairness require-
ments of section 315 by giving or selling time to a candidate's spokesper-
son rather than the candidate herself. It is very likely that obligations of
fairness to present adequate coverage of issues of public importance are
implicated in this situation. Yet the fairness doctrine itself would not
require the licensee to provide any broadcast time to the opposing candi-
date, but would only require that the issue receive adequate coverage.
Such a result creates a large loophole in the statute and disregards con-
120. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170 (1927) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982)).
121. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, BROADCASTING EQUAL TIME
REQUIREMENTS-NEwsCASTS, S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2564, 2569 (statement of Sen. Dill).
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gressional intent to prevent discrimination between competing
candidates.1
22
The Commission recognized this reality in In re Nicholas Zapple. 12 3
The Zapple rule requires licensees, who present political programs or an-
nouncements using a spokesman instead of a candidate, to give oppo-
nents equal opportunities for that broadcasting time as required under
section 315. Although the Zapple rule is limited in application to the
Commission's former interpretation of the fairness doctrine, the Zapple
rule should apply to teletext. Even though the Commission has declared
the doctrine unconstitutional and will no longer enforce it,124 the Zapple
rule should still apply to teletext. The Commission should apply the
Zapple rule administratively through section 315 to continue enforce-
ment of the underlying principle. If the Commission fails to do so, sec-
tion 315 should be legislatively amended to include the rule to prevent
extensive abuse of the equal opportunity doctrine of section 315.125
In summary, teletext must be subject to the section 315 require-
ments because it is capable of a "use," under the current definition. Even
if it were not, the legislative history of section 315 demonstrates that the
Commission is obligated to revise the definition of "use" to reflect new
broadcasting methods such as teletext. Finally, the Commission should
apply the Zapple rule to teletext to prevent abusive practices by broad-
casting licensees.
D. The Fairness Doctrine
The main controversy surrounding the fairness doctrine is whether
Congress has codified the doctrine. If Congress has codified it, the Com-
mission does not have the option of excluding new technologies from its
reach. If the fairness doctrine has not been codified, as the TRAC court
found, then the Commission has the discretion to rule that new technolo-
gies such as teletext need not meet the requirements of that doctrine.
The Commission recognized in its 1985 Fairness Report that deter-
mining whether Congress has required retention of the fairness doctrine
is difficult. 126 As will be shown in the following discussion, the Commis-
122. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text for a summary of Congressional intent
in this matter.
123. 23 F.C.C. 2d 707 (1970).
124. 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 31, at 61,91. Obsolescence of the fairness doctrine
is a distinct possibility, as discussed infra notes 185-202 and accompanying text, unless Con-
gress is able to codify the doctrine.
125. The Senate did propose a partial codification of the Zapple rule as part of the Federal
Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess.,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5587. 5671. The amendment was not
adopted. The failure to expressly contradict the Commission's application of the doctrine,
however, implies Congressional approval.
126. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 31, at 35,453. Earlier in the same report the Com-
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sion may have grossly understated the situation. After outlining the rele-
vant areas of difficulty, I conclude that the TRAC court correctly
determined that the doctrine has not been codified, and that the Commis-
sion possessed the authority to refuse to extend the fairness doctrine to
teletext. Even though affording an exemption for teletext was within the
Commission's authority, such a course of action was arbitrary and capri-
cious, because no principled distinction can be made between teletext and
all other types of broadcasting that were subject to the fairness doctrine
at that time.
127
(1) Development of the Fairness Doctrine
Fairness doctrine obligations were imposed on broadcasters as early
as 1929,128 and the Commission formally set forth such obligations in its
1949 Fairness Report.129 At that time, the Commission recognized that
the statutory basis for the doctrine was the general duty of licensees to
serve the public interest.130 If this report were the only statement of the
doctrine, then the Commission would definitely have the right to refuse
to apply the policy to teletext and possibly would have the right to aban-
don the policy completely. Subsequent restatements and developments
affecting the doctrine, however, arguably affect that right.
Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 is the center of the
codification controversy. 131 The history of that section and of the fair-
ness doctrine began before the Act was actually passed, when Congress
discussed but did not include fairness language in section 315.132 In
1952, Congress again declined the opportunity to include fairness lan-
guage in a revision of section 315.133
Then, in 1959, Congress made an addition to section 315 that might
be read as codifying the fairness doctrine. The amendment provides:
mission stated that it does not believe that the doctrine is codified, but it did not reach a final
conclusion in this regard. Id. at 35,446.
127. The Commission recently ruled that no broadcasting stations are obligated to abide
by the fairness doctrine. See infra notes 185-202 and accompanying text. But because the
Commission had not abandoned the fairness doctrine prior to the TRAC decision, the grant of
an exemption can only be viewed as contrary to the current state of the law.
128. See Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. 32, 33 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37
F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930); see also Mayflower Broadcasting
Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1941); Young People's Ass'n for the Propagation of the Gospel, 6
F.C.C. 178, 181, 185 (1938).
129. See supra note 31.
130. 1949 Fairness Report, supra note 31, at 1250.
131. See supra note 25 for the language of § 315 as it reads today.
132. See S. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); 67 CONG. REc. 5560-61 (1926)
(statement of Rep. Johnson); COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMUNICATION
ACT OF 1934, S. REP. No. 781, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
133. See 98 CONG. REc. 7415 (1952) (statement of Rep. Horan). As late as 1986, the
House-Senate Conference Committee rejected a move to codify the Fairness Doctrine. See
Broadcasters Block Fairness Doctrine Codification, 26 TV Dig., Oct. 13, 1986, at 2.
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Nothing in the foregoing sentence ... shall be construed as relieving
broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news
interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news
events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this Act to oper-
ate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
134
This addition clearly seems to refer to the fairness doctrine, 135 but
both the statutory language and the legislative history are ambiguous.
The primary difficulty in interpreting the legislative history is the absence
of any clear evidence that Congress actually considered itself to be codi-
fying the fairness doctrine. 136 Congress made this amendment to section
315 to exclude newscasts from the definition of "use," allowing broad-
casters to present news without becoming subject to the equal opportu-
nity and fairness provisions of that section.137 Accordingly, because the
legislative history is very unclear, I will discuss it only as it supports or
refutes points made in the following section.
(2) The Codification Controversy
The fairness doctrine was adopted and implemented to ensure ade-
quate coverage of issues of public importance. Former Chief Justice
(then Circuit Judge) Burger once observed that "adherence to the Fair-
ness Doctrine is a sine qua non of every licensee."' 138 The fear is that if
adherence to the fairness doctrine is not required, then broadcast licen-
sees would present only one-sided coverage of important public issues. 139
At least one commentator has even gone so far as to say that "if the
[fairness] doctrine is eliminated. . . 'the entire scheme of the Communi-
cations Act would be effectively undermined.' "14
134. See Act of September 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982)).
135. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 31, at 35,448.
136. The recent congressional attempt to codify the fairness doctrine reinforces the current
belief that Congress does not think the doctrine has ever been codified. See Fairness in Broad-
casting Act of 1987, S.742, H.R. 1934, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); see infra note 150.
137. The amendment was a response to a threat from broadcasters that, unless Congress
reversed a Commission ruling making § 315 applicable to political candidates on newscasts,
the broadcasters might black out radio and television news coverage of political campaigns.
1985 Fairness Report, supra note 31, at 35,449. Unfortunately, the pressure of the approach-
ing national political conventions may have prompted Congress to act too hastily.
138. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 359 F.2d 994, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
139. The only other public interest obligation now imposed on broadcasters by the Com-
mission is the obligation to present adequate issue-oriented programming. Id.; Action for
Children's Television v. Federal Commuications Comm'n, No. 96-1425 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Ad-
equate issue-oriented programming does not necessarily require that both sides of an issue be
presented.
140. Public Trustee Concept in Danger, Say Citizen Groups, 111 BROADCASTING, Oct. 13,
1986, at 77, 77-79.
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As the courts are wont to say, "the starting point in every case in-
volving statutory construction is 'the language employed by Con-
gress.'"141 Thus, this analysis will begin with an examination of the
statutory language.
A part of the controversy concerns whether a reference in the 1959
amendment to "the obligation imposed upon [broadcasters] under this
Act" constituted codification of the fairness doctrine. 142 Judge Bork re-
cently analyzed this language:
[T]he disclaimer refers to an obligation imposed "under this [Act]."
No one claims that in 1959 Congress imposed such an obligation else-
where in the [Act]. The statute obviously refers to an obligation previ-
ously imposed... [I]t is quite clear that Congress had not previously
enacted the fairness doctrine. The only alternative is that the reference
is to an obligation previously imposed by the Commission "under this
[Act]." The disclaimer then states that the preceding sentence is not to
be construed as relieving broadcasters of the Commission's fairness
doctrine.
143
According to Judge Bork, the 1959 amendment was simply meant to
disclaim any change in the fairness policy of the Commission, rather that
of Congress. 144
Judge Bork's analysis of the language cannot be faulted. The
"under this Act" language could not refer to a previously enacted con-
gressional fairness doctrine, since Congress indisputably had not codified
the doctrine before 1959. Thus, "this Act" must refer to the Communi-
cations Act. The Communications Act does not include any Commis-
sion-created doctrines, but rather includes only congressional statutes.
This language, therefore, must be referring to the mandate found in the
Communications Act that the Commission may regulate as the "public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires."' 45 The Commission created
the fairness doctrine to effect this mandate, and therefore the conclusion
that the "this Act" language refers to the Commission's fairness doctrine
is almost certainly correct.
The legislative history of the 1959 addition to section 315 may be
read to support either side of the codification controversy. While there is
no evidence that Congress definitely did not intend to codify the doc-
trine, "there is [similarly] no evidence that clearly demonstrates an intent
141. E.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 453 U.S.
367, 377 (1981) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979)).
142. See Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 66-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 556 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(a) (1982)).
143. Telecommunications Research v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 806 F.2d 1115,
1119 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (denial of petitioner's suggestion for a rehearing en banc) (emphasis
added).
144. Id.
145. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
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by Congress to codify the doctrine." 146 If Congress meant to codify the
doctrine, however, "it surely would have employed a more direct and less
offhanded approach" 147 than adding a less than explicit proviso to an
already existing statute.
A recent reference to the fairness doctrine by Congress appears to
affirm this interpretation. In the 1986 Appropriations Act, Congress
stated that "funds appropriated to the [Commission] by this Act shall be
used to consider alternative means of administration and enforcement of
the Fairness Doctrine and to report to the Congress." 148 Congress also
stated that the Commission "shall not change the regulation concerning
the Fairness Doctrine without submitting the required report to Con-
gress on this matter." 149 If Congress believed it had codified the doc-
trine, then it would not allow the Commission to consider changing the
doctrine without congressional approval. 150 Further, Congress would
not have called the determining law a "regulation," a term typically re-
served for administrative rulings.
Finally, and most convincing, is the judicial interpretation of the
doctrine, and of the statute and its legislative history. In the TRA C opin-
ion, both the dissent and Judge Bork discussed the following statement
made by the Red Lion Court:
This language makes it very plain that Congress, in 1959, announced
that the phrase "public interest," which had been in the Act since
1927, imposed a duty on broadcasters to discuss both sides of contro-
versial public issues. In other words, the amendment vindicated the
[Commission's] general view that the fairness doctrine inhered in the
public interest standard. Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of
an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory
construction. 1
51
According to the dissent, this language proved that the amendment
codified the fairness doctrine.15 2 Judge Bork, on the other hand, read
146. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 31, at 35,451 (emphasis added). For a summary of
the entire legislative history of this issue, see id. at 35,446-51.
147. Telecommunications Research, 806 F.2d at 1119.
148. 132 CONG. REC. HI0,619 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986).
149. Id. at H10,720 (emphasis added).
150. A Congressional request for a report, however, is not a legally binding obligation, but
rather is a practical step taken to avoid unnecessary conflict between Congress and an adminis-
trative agency. See Meredith Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 809 F.2d 863, 873
n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, S.742, H.R. 1934, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1987), provides further evidence that Congress does not believe the doctrine
has been codified. Although the bill was never adopted because President Reagan vetoed it, see
133 CONG. REC. S.8453-S.8454 (daily ed. June 3, 1987), the bill was intended to codify the
fairness doctrine, making obvious that Congress did not believe it had previously codified the
doctrine in § 315.
151. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 380-
81 (1969).
152. Telecommunications Research, 806 F.2d at 1116-17 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
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this language as saying either that Congress codified the fairness doctrine
in 1927 with the passage of the Communications Act, or that the public
interest concept enacted in 1927 gave the Commission the power to cre-
ate the doctrine.1
53
Judge Bork's second explanation of the language is the more reason-
able. The plain language of the Red Lion opinion itself, however, does
not necessarily decide the question. 154 In order to apprehend the mean-
ing of this passage, it must be read in the context of the opinion as a
whole. It becomes obvious that the Red Lion court viewed the language
added in the 1959 amendment as merely ratifying the congressional un-
derstanding that the fairness doctrine is an administrative regulation au-
thorized by the public interest standard. The Court clearly did not view
the 1959 amendment as codifying that doctrine.
In Red Lion, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he fairness doctrine
finds specific recognition in statutory form, is in part modeled on explicit
statutory provisions relating to political candidates, and is approvingly
reflected in legislative history." 155 As Judge Bork said, "[t]his is not the
language of mandatory direction but of authorization." 156 The Supreme
Court also found that "the amendment [of section 315] vindicated the
[Commission's] general view that the fairness doctrine inhered in the
public interest standard." 157 If the fairness doctrine "inhered" in the
public interest standard of the Communications Act, then there would
have been no need for Congress to codify it as part of section 315, for it
would already have been law. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
stated that "[ilt is the fairness doctrine as an aspect of the obligation to
operate in the public interest, rather than section 315, which prohibits the
broadcaster from [circumventing section 315 to favor one candidate over
another]."158 If the Supreme Court thought the fairness doctrine was
part of section 315, the above sentence would have made no sense.
These statements show that the Supreme Court did not believe in
1969 that Congress had codified the Commission's fairness doctrine.
This interpretation of the 1969 Red Lion opinion has been affirmed in
subsequent cases. For instance, in Columbia Broadcasting System v.
Democratic National Committee, the Supreme Court held that section
312(a) "codified" the Commission's prior interpretation of section
315(a), and that the fairness doctrine received only "statutory ap-
153. Id. at 1119.
154. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 453 U.S. 367,
367 (1981) (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979)) ("[Ihe language of an
opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute.").
155. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380.
156. Telecommunications Research, 806 F.2d at 1120.
157. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380.
158. Id. at 383 (emphasis added).
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proval." 159 Had the Court believed it to be the case, it could have found
that the fairness doctrine had been "codified" in section 315, just as it
found that the Commission's interpretation of section 315(a) had been
"codified" in section 312(a). The failure to do so leads to the conclusion
that, in the view of the Supreme Court, the doctrine has not been
codified. 1
60
(3) Teletext and the Fairness Doctrine
The uncodified status of the fairness doctrine permits the Commis-
sion to rule that new technologies do not have to meet any fairness doc-
trine obligations. Because the Commission implemented the doctrine
under the public interest standard, however, the Commission must "ac-
knowledge and justify" any change in the implementation of the doc-
trine. 161 Since the fairness doctrine applies to broadcasting media and
teletext is a form of broadcasting, the Commission's exemption of teletext
from the requirements of the doctrine constitutes such a change in
implementation.
The Commission justified its action on the grounds that it did not
wish to impede the growth of a new technology. Although the court
accepted this justification for the change in implementation of the doc-
trine, the rationale that the public interest is better served by exempting
teletext from the fairness doctrine is not supported by the facts, as Senior
Circuit Judge McKinnon found in his dissent. 162 For example, lack of
monetary compensation for teletext services is not an impediment to the
technology's development, because teletext broadcasters may charge
those who wish to present issues of public interest the same rates they
charge commercial advertisers. Furthermore, although opponents argue
that reduced viewer interest in teletext will result if the Commission re-
quires access for the presentation of public issues, an examination of the
nature of teletext contradicts this argument. With television or radio,
implementation of the equal time requirements under the fairness doc-
159. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 113-114 n.12
(1973).
160. A recent statement by the Supreme Court in Federal Communications Comm'n v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), can be read as saying the Court does not
consider the doctrine to be codified. The Court states in a footnote that "[o]f course, the
Commission may, in the exercise of its discretion, decide to modify or abandon [the fairness
doctrine] rules, and we express no view on the legality of either course." Id. at 378 n. 12. This
language could also be read as simply leaving the resolution of the question to a future date,
however, and is vague enough to defy any definite conclusions.
161. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 444 F.2d 841,
852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 3923 (1971); see also International Union (UAW)
v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("It is an elementary tenet of administrative
law that an agency must either conform to its own precedents or explain its departure from
them.").
162. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 519 (McKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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trine automatically limits the time available for other programs that may
be more popular or generate higher revenues. Additionally, unlike televi-
sion and radio broadcasting, teletext does not limit viewers to only one
program per station at any particular time. A teletext viewer may view
the screen provided to present public interest issues as required under the
fairness doctrine, but he is not limited to that screen. Thus, the viewer
who is uninterested in the public programming can simply switch to an
earlier or later screen that pertains to a topic of greater interest, just as
the reader of the newspaper can choose either to read or not to read any
particular article. Also, the teletext broadcaster is not limited to present-
ing only the program required to comply with the fairness doctrine re-
quirements, but may bring in other programs that potentially could
enhance, rather than impede, the development of teletext.
The Commission's justification for exempting teletext is also insuffi-
cient. The Commission claims that imposing the fairness doctrine on
licensees will substantially and adversely affect the development of the
teletext broadcast medium, and that therefore the public interest is better
served by not subjecting teletext to the fairness doctrine. 163 Although
this may be true of other new types of technology, in the case of teletext
the public interest lies in application of the fairness doctrine.
The problems that inhere from exemption of teletext become appar-
ent when one studies the possible consequences. For example, an ex-
empted teletext broadcaster could allow one individual or group access to
teletext while refusing access to other individuals or groups. Such biased
access could result in viewers receiving an incomplete or even erroneous
picture of issues of importance to the entire community. To further com-
plicate matters, because many broadcast stations are controlled by a few
networks owned by large companies, this ability to discriminate is placed
in the hands of entities far removed from the local communities served by
the stations. Broadcasters will provide access to those teletext users will-
ing to pay the highest price, allowing the market to control access. Con-
sequently, broadcasters will not adequately present contrasting
viewpoints on important controversial issues of interest to the commu-
nity, because those potential teletext users with fewer financial resources
will not be capable of competing in the market for access. The important
goal of protecting the viewers' first amendment right to receive informa-
tion in the marketplace of ideas is thus turned into meaningless jargon.
In conclusion, although the Commission has correctly concluded
that the fairness doctrine is not codified, it incorrectly refused to apply it
to teletext and failed to justify that decision adequately. First, the char-
acteristics of teletext require an analysis different from that employed by
the Commission. Additionally, the Commission failed to make a rea-
soned and well-balanced argument countering the greater public interest
163. Teletext Order, supra note 1 at 27,062.
November 1987]
favoring application of the fairness doctrine to teletext. Finally, the
Commission's conclusion that teletext development may be inhibited by
application of the fairness doctrine is not sufficiently supported by the
facts.
The status of broadcasting law at the time of the TRAC decision
required the Commission and the courts to subject teletext licensees to
the political broadcasting regulations of reasonable access, equal oppor-
tunity, and the fairness doctrine. Although the TRAC court properly
recognized that teletext is broadcasting and subject to the equal opportu-
nity requirements of section 315, it incorrectly exempted teletext from
both the reasonable access requirements of section 312(a)(7) and the obli-
gations imposed by the fairness doctrine. The TRAC decision may sim-
ply have come before its time. For although incorrectly decided, the
court addressed some issues that will be important to teletext and other
forms of broadcasting in the future. The following discussion examines
and analyzes these issues.
V. The Future of Content Regulation and of Teletext
The future of teletext content regulation will depend on the state of
broadcasting content regulation in general. The following section
presents a few of the crucial areas subject to change and explains how
any changes will affect teletext.
A. The Obsolescence of the Scarcity Doctrine
The scarcity doctrine is based on the claimed scarcity of airwaves.
As technology advances, it is becoming increasingly apparent that factual
support for the rationale behind the scarcity doctrine is diminishing.
Although Red Lion was decided less than twenty years ago, many scien-
tific advances of great importance have occurred during the intervening
years, including the growth of a wider spectrum of broadcast services. 164
There are two primary arguments supporting the contended obsoles-
cence of the scarcity doctrine. First, as the TRA C court correctly noted,
virtually all goods in society are scarce in that their supply is limited. 65
The science of economics shows us that, in a free market ecenomy, this
scarcity normally is resolved through the forces of supply and demand.
164. As the Supreme Court has recognized: "The problems of regulation are rendered
more difficult because the broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change;
solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable today may
well be outmoded 10 years hence." Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).
165. The first and most convincing introduction of this argument was made by R.H. Coase
in The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 13-19 (1959), but it has
been addressed since then by others. See Bazelon, supra note 50, at 224-25; Fowler & Brenner,
supra note 50, at 221.
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Put simply, the price rises or drops until the quantity demanded is equal
to the quantity supplied. The resultant market efficiency not only results
in the most accurate pricing structure, but it also encourages buyers and
users to take advantage of a resource to the greatest extent possible.
166
Since all goods in society are scarce, that scarcity alone "can hardly ex-
plain regulation in one context and not another."'167 Thus, not only is
the scarcity doctrine deprived of theoretical justification but it further
carries the potential of adversely affecting the efficiency of the market
mechanism.
Second, and equally convincing, even though the Supreme Court
has yet to recognize it, the broadcast spectrum simply is no longer
scarce. 168 The TRAC court acknowledged this argument but failed to
analyze it correctly. The court essentially held that broadcast frequen-
cies are not scarce because the number of broadcast stations may be
greater than the number of newspapers and magazines that could effec-
tively carry a political message. 169 Broadcast frequencies do not become
plentiful, however, simply because they may be less scarce than another
resource. Instead, broadcasting frequencies become plentiful as techno-
logical change allows the resource to develop and expand. Teletext is a
perfect example of this progression, as seen by its utilization of a previ-
ously unused part of the broadcast spectrum, the vertical blanking
interval.
The argument that cable and satellite advances have made obsolete
the scarcity doctrine also is irrational, because the mere existence of
other nonbroadcasting methods of telecommunications do not make the
broadcasting spectrum any larger. If there is a true spectrum scarcity,
then it logically follows the current spectrum should be filled. Except in
the largest markets, however, the broadcasting spectrum is not com-
pletely filled. Justifying content regulation in those nonsaturated mar-
166. In the fully deregulated marketplace, the highest bidder should make the best and
highest use of the resource. R. BORK, ANTrrRusT THEORY AND PRACTICE 98 (1975).
167. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 508 (footnote omitted).
168. The number of radio and television stations has doubled since 1960. This alone raises
doubts about scarcity. R. NEUSTADT, supra note 4, at 26-27. Furthermore, the broadcast
spectrum is only of what might be termed "medium" scarcity, and the increasing use of higher
frequencies has helped to erode any scarcity that once existed. I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note
50, at 234-47; see also R. NEUSTADT at 38-39; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 50, at 222. The
real scarcity is of economic resources and the more pressing concern is the "need that basic
communications networks be universal in reach." See I. DE SOLA POOL, supra at 237.
Although Congress has found that scarcity still exists in broadcasting, see Fairness in Broad-
casting Act of 1987, S. 742, H.R. 1934, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987). President Reagan recog-
nized the obsolescence of the doctrine by vetoing the Act. 133 CONG. REc. S.8453-48454
(daily ed. June 3, 1987).
169. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 508-09 n.4. This argument was also put forth by Bazelon, supra
note 50, at 224-25.
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kets with a theory of scarcity is less than convincing. 170
The Supreme Court has recognized that these problems exist, yet it
is "not prepared . . . to reconsider [its] longstanding approach without
some signal from Congress or the [Commission] that technological devel-
opments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broad-
cast regulation may be required."17 1 The Court recently received two
incompatible signals. The Commission declared the scarcity doctrine ob-
solete, 172 while Congress expressly recognized that the "electromagnetic
spectrum remains a scarce and valuable public resource." 173 If the Court
adopts the Commission's signal as the appropriate one, political broad-
casting regulations could advance in one of two directions. Either new
doctrines may develop to support the regulations, or there may be recog-
nition that there should be no content regulation of broadcasting at all.
Potential support for continuing to enforce the political broadcasting reg-
ulations may be found in the pervasive presence of broadcasting theory
or in the licensing oligopoly theory. On the other side of the coin, the
marketplace theory of regulation could take over the broadcasting mar-
ket and political broadcasting regulations could become unnecessary. A
discussion of these options follows.
(1) Pervasive Presence of Broadcasting
The Supreme Court has stated that one of the reasons broadcasting
receives very limited first amendment protection is that the broadcast
media has established a "uniquely pervasive presence" in the lives of
Americans. 174 This theory is the only one that could potentially be used
to treat teletext differently from other forms of broadcasting, as teletext
has a less "pervasive" presence due to the fact that it must be read. The
Court has used this theory only in Pacifica, however, and it is probably




The Supreme Court gave yet another explanation for political
broadcasting regulations in Red Lion. After discussing the current rela-
tive scarcity in the broadcasting field and finding that not all of the spec-
trum must be utilized to be considered scarce, the court stated in dictum
that:
170. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 50, at 225; Bazelon, supra note 50, at 224.
171. Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-77
& n. 11 (1984).
172. See 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 31, at 73-74.
173. Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, S. 742, H.R. 1934, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
174. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
175. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
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Even where there are gaps in spectrum utilization, the fact remains
that existing broadcasters have often attained their present position be-
cause of their initial government selection in competition with
others.... Long experience in broadcasting, confirmed habits of listen-
ers and viewers, network affiliation, and other advantages... give ex-
isting broadcasters a substantial advantage over new entrants, even
where new entry is technologically possible. These advantages are the
fruit of a preferred position conferred by the Government.
176
Thus, the possibility that a spectrum is available does not, according
to the Court, necessarily lead to the conclusion that regulation is uncon-
stitutional. The government's role in allocating the frequencies may it-
self justify regulation to uphold the public's need to express and hear
varying viewpoints. The Supreme Court presented this theory in Red
Lion almost as an afterthought, and the theory has been overlooked due
to the general popularity of the scarcity doctrine. If the scarcity doctrine
actually becomes obsolete, the licensing oligopoly theory may become
more accepted and it therefore merits some examination.
The Supreme Court may use this theory in connection with the prin-
ciple that the first amendment rights of the viewing and listening public
are the most important consideration in media regulation. To do so, it
would view the government-granted exclusivities as contingent licenses.
Instead of charging a large licensing fee, the government would make the
license contingent on meeting the public's need to receive information.
The licensee does not have to enter the arena, but once it decides to enter,
it must follow the rules. This reasoning is analogous to any other busi-
ness decision in which the licensee must swallow the bad with the good.
There is a basic flaw with this reasoning, however. That licensing
exists does not necessarily lead to a need for content regulation. As the
next section explains, the marketplace is potentially capable of protecting
the public.
(3) Marketplace Regulation
For some reason, the free-market approach to broadcasting did not
appear in the early years of broadcasting development. 177 It is a topic of
increasing popularity today, however, as the Commission leans towards
less regulation in the communications field. 178 Originally broadcasters
operated in a marketplace free of regulation. This system was flawed
176. Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 400
(1969).
177. Coase, supra note 165, at 17 (president of CBS called it a "new and novel concept" in
1958).
178. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 50, at 209 (former commission chairman Mark
Fowler believed broadcasters should be viewed as market participants, not as community
trustees); Teletext Order, supra note 1, at 27,060 ("[t]he open market approach provides a
system for resolving trade-offs among various services and different technical systems' charac-
teristics and prices.").
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because there was no control over who could use any particular fre-
quency. This resulted in Congress' decision to pervasively regulate
broadcasters: not only were broadcasters licensed in order to take care of
the chaos, they were also restricted in content, time schedules, and meth-
ods they could employ in broadcasting information.
Deregulation would put broadcasting on more equal terms with
newspapers and magazines, two information sources that have received
more first amendment protection in the past both because they "behaved
so as to discourage the issue from arising,"' 179 and because they have tra-
ditionally fought to protect their rights more than broadcasters. 180 De-
regulation of broadcasting, however, also could lead to problems with
providing the viewing and listening public with the information needed
to protect its first amendment rights, the constitutional key to political
broadcasting regulations as recognized by the Supreme Court. 181 The
general public may be left to the whim of those with money, as "[m]arket
forces can be expected to provide the amounts and types of service that
are responsive to users' willingness and ability to pay for them."'
' 82
Therefore, although the marketplace approach makes theoretical
sense, it fails to address the real concerns of the general public in receiv-
ing full and fair information. Whether the Supreme Court would find
that the marketplace, especially considering the increased competition in
the broadcasting market, 183 will safeguard the interests of the public is
unknown. Since Justice Scalia is now on the Supreme Court, with Judge
Bork nominated, the Chicago-school judicial conservatives may be will-
ing to take the risk. On the other hand, the more liberal justices may
look to Congress' determination that the marketplace is an inadequate
guard of the public interest' 84 and refuse to deregulate. In either event,
the content regulation of broadcasting could be the subject of many
changes in the future, and new technologies such as teletext will lead the
way as they provide new opportunities to review the theories and policies
behind regulation.
B. The Obsolescence of the Fairness Doctrine
The constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, along with the other
179. I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 50, at 238.
180. Id. at 239. Another author portrays this as a product of broadcasters' original per-
ception of themselves as entertainers rather than as the press. Bazelon, supra note 50, at 219.
181. Red Lion, 394 U.S. at 386-90 (1969).
182. Teletext Order, supra note 1, at 27,060.
183. R. NEUSTADT, supra note 4, at 26-27.
184. See Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, S. 742, H.R. 1934, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) where Congress attempted to codify the fairness doctrine because "there is a substantial
governmental interest in conditioning the award or renewal of a broadcast license on the re-
quirement that ... [broadcasters present] a reasonable opportunity for the discussion of con-
flicting views of issues of public importance."
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political broadcasting regulations, has rested upon the scarcity doctrine.
Thus, if the scarcity doctrine is found to be obsolete and no alternative
theory takes its place, the fairness doctrine will become obsolete. Even if
the scarcity doctrine is still viable, however, the fairness doctrine could
nevertheless become obsolete either because it does not serve the public
interest or because it is unconstitutional even when based upon a valid
scarcity doctrine.
In 1985, the Commission found that the fairness doctrine, as a mat-
ter of policy, no longer served the public interest.185 Prior to TRAC, this
statement and the entire 1985 Fairness Report had no effect on broad-
casting because the Commission decided that "it would be inappropriate
at this time for us to either eliminate or significantly restrict the scope of
the doctrine." 1 6 The Commission thought it would be inappropriate, in
part, because the controversy as to the codification of the doctrine was
unresolved.18 7 Now that the TRAC court has found that the doctrine is
not codified and thus is subject to Commission action, the Commission
philosophy behind the fairness doctrine is especially important.
Meredith Corporation v. Federal Communications Commission
188
highlights the Commission's role in this very important controversy. In
Meredith, the Commission found a violation of the fairness doctrine
when a broadcasting licensee (WTVH of Syracuse, New York, owned by
Meredith Corporation) refused to provide time for contrasting view-
points after an advertisement for a nuclear power plant was aired.
Although the Commission agreed that WTVH had eventually met its
obligations under the doctrine, thus relieving Meredith of any sanctions
or fines, Meredith challenged the agency's action. Meredith alleged that
the Commission "arbitrarily and capriciously enforced the fairness doc-
trine and [that] ... the doctrine in general and as applied to Meredith
violate[d] the first amendment."18 9
The court found that the Commission had not acted "arbitrarily and
capriciously" and sustained the Commission's determination that Mere-
dith had violated the fairness doctrine. 190 In addressing Meredith's con-
stitutional claim, the court was less direct. It first noted that "[f]ederal
courts traditionally have sought to avoid constitutional questions if at all
possible." 191 Recognizing that this particular constitutional question has
185. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 31, at 35,419.
186. Id.
187. In Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 809
F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court ordered future briefing on the question of whether the
Commission's refusal to either repeal or modify the doctrine based on the 1985 Fairness Re-
port was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 863.
188. 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
189. Id. at 865.
190. Id. at 871.
191. Id. at 872.
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especially far-reaching implications,192 it declined to determine the con-
stitutionality itself and instead directed the Commission to address the
constitutional question. 193
As a result of TRAC and Meredith, the Commission was given the
opportunity to declare the fairness doctrine obsolete. The Meredith court
explained the two routes the Commission had at its disposal: (1) it could
either declare the fairness doctrine unconstitutional, or (2) it could refuse
to enforce the doctrine because it is contrary to the public interest. 194
The Commission chose to declare the doctrine constitutional.1
95
The determination is supported by both Supreme Court1 96 and federal
circuit court 97 pronouncements. It is unusual for an administrative
agency, however, to decide the constitutionality of issues' 98 and thus the
Commission would have been more secure if it relied on its belief that the
doctrine no longer supports the public interest. The Commission viewed
the policy implications as being too completely intertwined with the con-
stitutional implications to be separated, however; thus the Commission-
ers reached the constitutional question.
The Commission relied on the very thorough and comprehensive
192. Id. The court, however, did not articulate these far-reaching implications.
193. Id. Judge Silberman, one of the panel members, was not pleased that the Commis-
sion had not already decided the constitutional question. He stated that the Commission prob-
ably did not decide the question because it was waiting for federal judges, who have lifetime
tenure, to decide the question. See Appeals Court Troubled by FCC Positions on Fairness, 26
TV Dig., Oct. 6, 1986, at 4.
194. Meredith, 809 F.2d at 874.
195. 52 Fed. Reg. 31,768 (1987).
196. In Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Court stated that "if experience with the ad-
ministration of these doctrines indicates that they have the net effect of reducing rather than
enhancing the volume and quality of coverage, there will be time enough to reconsider the
constitutional implications." Id. at 393. More recently, in Federal Communications Comm'n
v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the Court reaffirmed the fact that the consti-
tutionality of the doctrine is predicated on a rebuttable presumption that the doctrine enhances
the coverage of controversial issues, and that the Court would be obligated to reevaluate the
constitutionality of the doctrine if the Commission demonstrated the falsity of that presump-
tion. Id. at 378-79 n.12.
197. "If the fairness doctrine cannot withstand First Amendment scrutiny, the reason is
that to insure a balanced presentation of controversial issues may be to insure no presentation,
or no vigorous presentation, at all." Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 405 F.2d
1082, 1102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted), cert. denied sub. nom. American Broadcast-
ing Cos. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); see also Straus Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 530 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Despite
[the holding of Red Lion], important constitutional questions continue to haunt this area of the
law. The doctrine and the rule do, after all, involve the Government to a significant degree in
policing the content of communication ... [and there are] abiding First Amendment difficul-
ties." Id. at 1008 (footnote omitted)).
198. "[A]djudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally
been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies." Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361, 368 (1974) (quoting Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (V/ol. 39
1985 Fairness Report as support for its decision. 199 A complete analysis
of the report is not within the scope of this Note, but the reasoning be-
hind the Commission's determination that the fairness doctrine no longer
serves the public interest and is unconstitutional can be summarized as
follows:
(1) Although the interest of the viewing and listening public in ob-
taining access to diverse and antagonistic sources of information is valid,
the fairness doctrine is not a necessary or appropriate means of effectuat-
ing this interest.
(2) Rather, the interest of the public is served by the multiplicity
of voices in the marketplace.
(3) Furthermore, the fairness doctrine unnecessarily restricts the
journalistic freedom of broadcasters and actually inhibits the presenta-
tion of controversial issues of public importance.
2°°
Thus, the result of TRAC and Meredith was a Commission determi-
nation that the fairness doctrine is obsolete. This action will probably be
followed by a new attempt by Congress to codify the doctrine20' and
Supreme Court review. The effect on teletext broadcasting will be mini-
mal, but the effect on teletext and other broadcast viewers may be great,
as issues of public importance receive little attention from broadcasters.
C. The Potential Supreme Court Determination
The Supreme Court denied the TRAC writ of certiorari.20 2 The fair-
ness doctrine will almost assuredly reach the Court in the future, how-
ever, since fairness doctrine advocates are unlikely to easily accept the
Commission's decision to cease enforcing the doctrine. With the Com-
mission's decision, broadcasters may be permitted to make changes in the
way they present issues of public importance. Broadcasters will not be
obligated to present opposing views on such issues if the only require-
ments imposed on them are those of section 312(a)(7), section 315, and
the requirement of adequate presentation of issue-oriented
programming.20
3
For example, if someone other than the candidate herself-the
spokesperson for a candidate for example-desires to counter an oppos-
ing candidate's statement, section 315 would not require the broadcaster
to provide equal access to the individual.204 Furthermore, if independent
199. 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 31, at 3.
200. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 31, at 35,419.
201. See F.C.C. Votes Down the Fairness Doctrine, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at Al, col. 6
(city ed.) ("several members of Congress have vowed to renew their efforts to enact the doc-
trine into law.").
202. 55 U.S.L.W. 3821 (U.S. June 9, 1987).
203. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
204. Gloria W. Sage, 39 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1603, 1604-05 (1977). However, the quasi-
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political action committees sponsor advertisements outside campaign pe-
riods, section 312 would not require the broadcaster to allow reasonable
access to an opposing individual. 20 5 In both of these cases, by contrast,
the fairness doctrine would potentially have provided access.
The Commission would probably argue that these results would be
acceptable, and that competition in the marketplace will force the broad-
casters to provide information that will further the public interest. Such
a change, however, would inhibit the viewer's very important first
amendment rights to receive information of public importance in the
"marketplace of ideas." 206
VI. Proposal
The issues addressed in this Note deal specifically with teletext, but
necessarily also reflect on other forms of broadcasting. The following
proposal therefore focuses on the regulation of teletext but will apply in
most instances to other broadcasting media as well.
The Supreme Court must recognize the obsolesence of the scarcity
doctrine. As demonstrated in section IV, the doctrine can no longer be
defended in rational terms. The doctrine is unnecessary and has been
outdated through scientific advancement that allows access to the air-
waves to most persons or entities with the desire and the economic re-
sources. The Supreme Court should not demolish all content regulation
of broadcasters, however, because the first amendment rights of the view-
ing and listening public must be protected. Instead, the Court must rec-
ognize that the enforcement of the regulations may be based solely on the
constitutional requirement of protecting the first amendment rights of
the viewing and listening public. No other justification is necessary.
The fairness doctrine should also be declared obsolete by a judicial
body. The Commission has recognized its obsolescence20 7 and the 1985
Fairness Report 20 8 more than adequately explains the decreased need for,
and the actual harm done by, the fairness doctrine. This does not mean
there should be no fairness regulation for broadcast licensees, however.
Instead, there should be a "fairness review" in conjunction with license
renewal proceedings. This concept has been proposed by Mr. Henry
fairness, quasi-equal opportunity doctrine may require equal opportunity. See supra notes 122-
25 and accompanying text.
205. See National Conservative Political Action Comm., 51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 233,
235-36 (1982).
206. The decision to cease enforcing the doctrine "means that broadcasters 'can ignore
crucial issues or present only one side' of debates .... Issues such as women's rights, the
health effects of smoking, and the safety of nuclear power plants would come to far less public
prominence had the fairness doctrine not been in effect." F. C. C. Votes Down Fairness Doctrine,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at C26, col. 4 (city ed.) (quoting consumer advocate Ralph Nader).
207. Id. at Al, col. 6.
208. See supra note 31.
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Geller and addressed by the Commission. 20 9 Mr. Geller recommends a
review of a broadcaster's compliance with fairness doctrine obligations
prior to any renewal of a license; and in order to afford the broadcaster
fair notice of potential problems, any complaints received by the Com-
mission would be referred to the licensees. The Commission did not re-
spond favorably to this recommended procedure.210 This system,
however, would ensure that the "American public... not be left unin-
formed" 211 and should be reconsidered by the Commission.
In addition to the fairness review, the Commission should continue
to enforce the Zapple rule of quasi-fairness, quasi-equal opportunity.
Whether it is enforced as part of the fairness review or under section 315
is irrelevant, as long as the loophole created by section 315 is closed.
Furthermore, the Commission, Congress, and the Supreme Court
should continue to enforce the political broadcasting regulations codified
in sections 312(a)(7) and 315. These sections provide media access to
individuals who might otherwise have none. Providing a candidate rea-
sonable time to present views and equal opportunity to respond to oppos-
ing views is essential to the American system of government. The
electorate increasingly turns to the broadcast media for information on
political figures, and if the media fails to provide a balanced presentation,
the electorate will be unable to make intelligent and informed decisions.
When combined with a fairness review, these two political broadcasting
regulations will provide adequate information to the public and the first
amendment rights of the viewers and listeners will be protected.
Finally, the Supreme Court should expressly recognize that the
broadcast media, in reality, has a pervasive presence in the lives of Amer-
icans. Although this will not provide an adequate explanation for every
situation (for instance, teletext does not have the same amount of perva-
siveness as television), the Court will at least be acknowledging reality.
Conclusion
Teletext is paving the way toward decreased content regulation of
all forms of broadcasting. Because it is similar to both print and televi-
sion, teletext is an ideal conduit for this change in broadcasting law. It is
not capable by itself, however, of causing this change. Until the law be-
hind application of the political broadcasting regulations is amended, the
209. Reconsideration of the 1974 Fairness Report, 36 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1023, 1023
(1975). Mr. Geller was formerly general counsel for the Commission, see Will FCC Repeal
Fairness Doctrine?, 111 BROADCASTING, Sept. 29, 1968, at 72, and is now Director of the
Washington Center for Public Policy Research.
210. Reconsideration of the 1974 Fairness Report, 36 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1023, 1027
(1975).
211. Green v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 447 F.2d 323, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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TRA C decision is incorrect; teletext is broadcasting, and broadcasting is
subject to the political broadcasting regulations.
Teletext broadcasters should allow candidates reasonable access to
their broadcast medium. It is patently unreasonable for broadcasters to
act in any other manner. This access would allow a candidate to better
explain her stand on the issues, thereby more fully and completely in-
forming the voters. Teletext broadcasters must also provide equal time to
opposing candidates, because teletext is capable of a "use" as that term is
employed in section 315 and thus is subject to that provision's equal op-
portunity requirements. Further, the Commission changed its policy
with respect to the fairness doctrine (before declaring the doctrine obso-
lete) without justification by not applying it to teletext broadcasting; such
a change was unjustified. Finally, the claim that application of the doc-
trine would impede teletext development is unfounded. For all of those
reasons, teletext should have been subject to the fairness doctrine
requirements.
Although teletext did not provide the appropriate place for a com-
plete change in the content regulation of broadcasting, the TRAC court
did introduce some very important issues, the resolution of which could
have far-reaching consequences. As implied by the court, the scarcity
doctrine is inadequate to explain broadcasting content regulation. All
resources are scarce, and thus broadcasting cannot logically be singled
out for regulation based solely on this universal fact. Furthermore, the
technological progression made in recent years has eliminated the origi-
nal scarcity of broadcast frequencies.
Like the scarcity doctrine, the fairness doctrine is also obsolete. The
Commission has concluded after a thorough report that the doctrine is
unconstitutional, no longer serves the public interest, and may in fact
impede technological development. Although Congress has attempted
and likely will attempt again to codify the doctrine, there are other, bet-
ter means of protecting the public's interest in receiving fair coverage of
issues of public importance. A fairness review procedure, for example,
would allow broadcasters to program and edit as desired, yet would also
subject them to review prior to renewal of their license.
Most importantly, any changes in the regulation of broadcasting
must reflect the necessity of providing insightful and complete informa-
tion to the viewing and listening public. Broadcasters should, and will, be
afforded greater discretion under the first amendment in terms of deter-
mining what they broadcast. However, the exercise of these rights must
not abridge the public's right to receive information. For better or worse,
ours is a society that looks to broadcasting media for information. This
reality gives rise to a public trust that must be carefully protected and
nurtured.
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